

Agency Information

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SUBJECTS :

KISSINGER, HENRY A.  
SCOWCROFT, BRENT  
ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS  
CIA  
COLBY, WILLIAM E.  
FORD, GERALD R.

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P/K  
5 Mar 75

210 <sup>2nd round</sup>  
9:11 12:03 A.M.  
9:11

P The Iranian deal played well.

K It was so screwed up - but it did appear well. On #40 Credit on Port. Stats think it a mistake because risk is out of proportion to gains. I don't see half a lot to gain by \$500,000. We could wind up w/ a worst possible set. Colby indicated he <sup>s</sup> wouldn't spend it. What do you think, Bent? ~~The advantage is the press is even more controllable~~

and a moderate party press is doing far more

P How can any we object to helping others press?

K That is what we did in Chile.

P If it is desirable, why shouldn't we?

K It will bankrupt both parties.

P That is a difficult case.

K Gerald told Colby to do what he can in ~~public~~ w/o spending a penny.

P Should I talk to Church?

K I would tell him - changes are that until will be penalized; how to protect sensitive data.

Colby never blackmailing me on a assassination story.

I + I asked Hobson to look into possibilities for coup in Chile in [csp]. Hobson said it wouldn't work.

Then I told a people who ~~said~~ it was discussed of how to bring up Schneider + killed him.

The OAS summit came out interestingly. He said open had to behave resp. + Algeria would agree to <sup>part</sup> except if its diplomatic budget was protected. Our policy is working. They are no longer pinning at a coup coup.

P What happening in FEA.

K we taking off, Dutch - we won't go except invitation to their court + that we set out + someone in [redacted]

~~if press reports are departing - Car at  
S & S Diesel (Rogers + people  
in car)~~

I think - Our evolution is very encouraging.

P. Some of ~~most~~ people in Ears must see we  
are making a progress and income

R That's right. One way would be to raise price, but to do  
that they would have to cut prod. They can't agree  
on how to allocate cuts. If we were free w/c Saudis,  
we could get at least a deal not to cut prod. That is  
why this discriminatory comparison of c Jers is antagonism

E ~~changed~~ my view. is to send them 7 mil  
+ encourage negot. Every a bus asked for  
and assist.

P what do they want. What kind of attitude is no.

R I favor it. They friendly and have more neighbors  
who are disturbing.

I'm very about it. They haven't asked for anyone  
for a oil fields - not even a study group.

If necessary, I would like letter from you saying  
you can't accept a statement + if we got however  
you will put forward. Modif. of a Roger plan (as  
works)

I think we just can't go to Geneva as long as fort

P The toughest position to get them to act is what  
I favor.

R Asad has even indicated he would take an invited  
represent & would sign a peace treaty. He was willing  
to dump PLO; now he enlisting PLO to Syria. They  
we can't bring Asad in - even tho. if I tried, he would  
be so obnoxious it would be slower than E and then  
we could move it to Geneva after E settled - but  
that too tricky. I would rather tell him - think  
privately - that we would make an effort as soon  
as E-I finish.

P That is my preference

K The big issue is will you take me to for another Sylva move.

P Give him a heads up and get them Geneva - which will fail, then we will have to go to us.

K I think about will want something before Geneva - the other would be ideal.

P Can't you talk tell him we will try to get something before Geneva?

K Yes, but you have to know that would be blinding w/c I. If we could get 5-10 km on Geneva we would be in good shape. It will claim it destroys their defensive cap.

It is important whether I can tell G and we will make a major effort. We will have to move into Geneva after F-C-I.

P If you think that is the best way to get progress, I am for it.

K We will be closer to a Sylva move, either before or after

P Suppose a I say lets go to Geneva, a S-V does -

K We can go to Geneva, what happens will depend on Sylva. Salut won't want Geneva - he will want to rest, come here for big things. I will want to to avoid Sylva negot, so Sylva won't want it. So only T + S-V will want to go to Geneva.

P Can't we commit to good faith effort?

K A good faith effort is bound to fail. It won't even get off ground - I don't think it will.

P A good faith effort & one is one what we put in

lines on

K OK. If I see opening to get us to Geneva - maybe

SC will carry a car to get everyone & Gerda what  
could be fine!

K I have given you a Schmidt file.

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